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Working memory serves as an essential workspace for the mind, allowing for the active maintenance of information to
support short-term cognitive goals. Although people can readily report the contents of working memory, it is unknown
whether they might have reliable metacognitive knowledge regarding the accuracy of their own memories. We investigated
this question to better understand the core properties of the visual working memory system. Observers were briefly
presented with displays of three or six oriented gratings, after which they were cued to report the orientation of a specific
grating from memory as well as their subjective confidence in their memory. We used a mixed-model approach to obtain
separate estimates of the probability of successful memory maintenance and the precision of memory for successfully
remembered items. Confidence ratings strongly predicted the likelihood that the cued grating was successfully maintained,
and furthermore revealed trial-to-trial variations in the visual precision of memory itself. Our findings provide novel evidence
indicating that the precision of visual working memory is variable in nature. These results inform an ongoing debate
regarding whether this working memory system relies on discrete slots with fixed visual resolution or on representations with
variable precision, as might arise from variability in the amount of resources assigned to individual items on each trial.
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Introduction
Visual perception is so highly efficient that people
commonly report having the subjective impression of
being able to take in an entire visual scene at a glance,
with relatively little effort (Cohen, Alvarez, & Nakaya-
ma, 2011; Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002;
Rousselet, Fabre-Thorpe, & Thorpe, 2002). However,
studies of working memory indicate that observers can
only maintain information about a limited number of
objects after viewing a complex scene (Luck & Vogel,
1997; Philips, 1974). To understand the profound
limitations of visual working memory, researchers have
adopted psychophysical methods to better characterize
the precision and capacity of this system (Magnussen &
Greenlee, 1999; Regan & Beverley, 1985; Wilken & Ma,
2004). In recent years, such research has led to a
bourgeoning debate regarding the fundamental proper-
ties and limits of the visual working memory system
(Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011; Bays, Catalao, &
Husain, 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008; van den Berg, Shin,
Chou, George, & Ma, 2012; Zhang & Luck, 2008).
The slot model theory proposes that visual working
memory consists of three to four discrete slots, each of
which can store information about a single perceptually
bounded object in an all-or-none manner (Luck &
Vogel, 1997). Critically, each slot is believed to support
a fixed level of visual resolution. According to the slots-
plus-averaging model, multiple independent slots can
be used to maintain information about a single item to
thereby improve the visual precision of memory for
that item (Zhang & Luck, 2008). However, if the
number of items exceeds the capacity limit of working
memory, then each available slot will be used to store
one unique item with a fixed degree of visual precision,
and any remaining items will fail to be encoded into
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working memory (Anderson et al., 2011). The discrete
nature of the slot model can be contrasted with
resource models, which propose that visual working
memory is supported by a continuous resource that can
be flexibly subdivided among many items. Resource
models assume that the working memory system lacks
a prespecified item limit; instead, this system should be
able to retain more than three to four items by flexibly
trading off visual resolution for increased capacity
(Bays et al., 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma,
2004). A more recent version of the resource model,
called the variable-precision model, proposes that the
amount of resource assigned to each item in a display
can randomly vary across items and trials (van den
Berg et al., 2012). Unlike the slots-plus-averaging
model, the variable-precision model assumes that the
precision of visual working memory is fundamentally
variable in nature and can fluctuate considerably from
item to item, and from trial to trial.
Distinguishing between these models of working
memory presents some empirical challenges. How
might one determine whether memory precision fluc-
tuates across trials, given that memory precision itself
must be estimated by quantifying the variability of
working memory performance across trials? In the
present study, we addressed this issue by asking
whether participants can make reliable metacognitive
judgments regarding the accuracy of their own
memories. If so, then it should be possible to evaluate
whether ratings of subjective confidence are predictive
of the precision of visual working memory.
Metacognition refers to the knowledge that one has
about one’s own cognitive experiences, processes, and
strategies (Flavell, 1979). It provides the basis for the
introspective ability to evaluate cognitive performance
in the absence of direct feedback. Studies have found
that people have reasonable metacognitive knowledge
about the accuracy of their perceptual judgments
(Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001; Nickerson &
McGoldrick, 1965; Song et al., 2011) and also their
judgments regarding long-term memory (Busey, Tun-
nicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Wixted, 2007; Yoneli-
nas, 1994). Recent studies suggest that participants can
also reliably evaluate the vividness of individual
episodes of mental imagery (Pearson, Rademaker, &
Tong, 2011; Rademaker & Pearson, 2012). However,
few, if any, studies have investigated the relationship
between metacognitive judgments and working memo-
ry in humans. Why might this be the case? Because the
contents of working memory are consciously accessible
and presumed to be maintained in an all-or-none
manner (Baddeley, 2003), it would appear to be
trivially easy to evaluate one’s own working memory
performance based simply on whether information
about the target item could be reported from memory.
Such a strategy would appear sufficient for evaluating
working memory for distinct categorical items, such as
digits, letters or words, but might prove inadequate for
stimuli that vary along a continuum. For example,
consider the task of maintaining a specific visual
orientation in memory and later attempting to report
that exact orientation by adjusting the angle of a probe
stimulus. Would the participant have any metacogni-
tive knowledge about how precisely he or she
performed this task, or any insight into the precision
with which that item was encoded and maintained in
working memory?
We addressed this question by using the psycho-
physical ‘method of adjustment’ to obtain a continuous
measure of the accuracy of working memory perfor-
mance on individual trials, as has been adopted in
many recent studies (Wilken & Ma, 2004; Zhang &
Luck, 2008). Observers were briefly presented with
displays containing three or six randomly oriented
gratings at the beginning of each trial (Figure 1). After
a 3-second delay period, a spatial cue appeared
indicating the grating to be reported from memory.
Observers first rated their confidence in their memory
for the probed item on a scale from 0–5, and then
adjusted the orientation of a test probe at the center of
the display to indicate the remembered orientation.
Monetary incentives were provided to encourage
participants to respond as accurately as possible. For
our analysis, we adopted the mixed-model approach to
obtain separate estimates of likelihood of successful
maintenance of the probed item and the precision of
working memory for successfully retained items (Zhang
& Luck, 2008). This allowed us to evaluate whether
subjective ratings of confidence were strongly predictive
of these two estimates of working memory performance
across individual trials. Our results revealed that higher
confidence ratings were predictive of both greater
likelihood of successful memory maintenance and




Six observers (three female) between the ages of 20
and 32 participated in the main experiment. Two of
these observers (CN and SJ) also participated in the
additional experiment (N¼ 6, five female, ages 20–28).
All observers had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity and received payment for participation ($10–15
per hour), with the exception of two participating
authors (RR and CT). All participants provided
informed written consent, and the study took place
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under the approval of the Institutional Review Board
of Vanderbilt University.
Participants viewed the stimuli in a dark room on a
luminance-calibrated CRT monitor (21 0 0 SONY Black
Professional Series FLAT Trinitron) with 1152 · 870
resolution and a 75-Hz refresh rate. Stimuli were
created using a Macintosh computer (Apple, CA) with
MATLAB 7.5.0 (R2007b) and Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli consisted of
randomly oriented gratings (size 28, spatial frequency
2 c/deg) presented around a central fixation point at an
eccentricity of 48. The gratings were presented at 50%
contrast within a Gaussian-contrast envelope (see
Figure 1) on a uniform gray background that shared
the same mean luminance of 35.8 cd/m2. Participants
sat at a viewing distance of 57 cm, and used a chinrest
to maintain head stability.
In the main experiment, observers were presented
with randomly mixed trials of either three or six
gratings to retain in working memory (Figure 1). For
each grating in a visual display, the orientation was
randomly and independently determined (0–1808). The
location assignment for each grating allowed for a
grating to be positioned anywhere at 48 eccentricity
from the central fixation point, with the only constraint
that each grating had to be separated from its neighbor
by at least 18. After a 3 s retention interval, spatial cues
appeared for 500 ms indicating the locations of sample
stimuli. A white circle of 0.108-thickness outlined the
location of the target grating to report from memory,
whereas nontarget locations were indicated by thinner
circles that were drawn using 0.048 outlines. After a 500
ms blank period, an auditory tone indicated that the
participant should report the quality of their memory
for the cued grating on a scale from 0 (no memory at
all) to 5 (best possible memory) within a 3 s response
window. Participants were instructed to use the full
range of the rating scale to the best of their abilities.
Finally, a test grating appeared at the center of the
screen at an initially random orientation. Participants
reported their memory for the orientation of the cued
grating by rotating the test grating, using separate
buttons on a keyboard for clockwise and counterclock-
wise rotation.
To encourage accurate performance, participants
were provided with monetary incentives to respond as
accurately as possible. They were told that they could
earn additional payment for very accurate performance
on each trial, receiving two bonus points for responses
that were accurate within 60–58 of the true orientation,
and one bonus point for responses that fell between 5–
108 of the true orientation. Each bonus point was worth
2 cents of additional payment. Cumulative feedback
was provided regarding the number of bonus points
that had been earned after every block of 20 trials. At
the end of each experimental session (160 trials), the
total amount of bonus points earned was displayed
again, along with the associated amount in US dollars.
Participants could obtain up to 50% more payment
than their base payment of $10/hr, depending on the
accuracy of their performance.
Each experimental session lasted between 30–45 min
and consisted of 160 trials. All participants completed
10 sessions in the main experiment, resulting in a total
of 1,600 trials, or 800 trials for set size 3 and an equal
number of trials for set size 6.
Analysis
To separately estimate the precision of memory for
successfully remembered items and the likelihood of
memory failure, we adopted a mixed-model approach
following the work of Zhang and Luck (Zhang & Luck,
2008, 2009). A circular Gaussian-shaped model was
used to fit the distribution of orientation errors
(reported orientation minus actual orientation) for
each condition of interest. The model consisted of
three key parameters: the mean or ‘‘center’’ of the
Gaussian distribution, the standard deviation (SD) or
width of the Gaussian distribution, and the extent to
which the entire distribution needed to be translated
along the y-axis to account for the frequency of
TIME














Figure 1. Experimental design. Sequence of events during a
working memory trial. A display of three or six randomly oriented
gratings was briefly presented, followed by a cue array that
appeared 3 s later, indicating which grating to report from
memory. Participants first rated their confidence in their memory
for the cued item on a scale from 0 (no memory at all) to 5 (perfect
memory), and then reported the orientation of the cued grating by
rotating a central test grating.
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uniform responses. The mean was constrained to lie
centered around a value of zero. Estimates of the other
two parameters were derived using standard function
fitting procedures in MATLAB (‘fminsearch’) to
implement the simplex search method.
The mixed model assumes that the relative propor-
tion of area under the curve corresponding to the
uniform distribution reflects the probability of memory
failure, whereas the standard deviation of the error
distribution reflects the precision of working memory
for successfully remembered items. We rely on these
summary statistics throughout this paper because they
provide a useful way to summarize broad trends in the
data and because they may also signify distinct types of
errors. However, it is important to acknowledge that
the mapping between these summary statistics and
underlying sources of error in the working memory
system rely on an assumed model of working memory
performance, and that competing models have been
proposed (e.g., van den Berg et al., 2012).
Model fitting of the group-averaged data was highly
robust for confidence ratings of 1 through 5. In the
main experiment, R2 values for these fits ranged from
0.73–0.99 (mean R2 of 0.916). Estimates of memory
precision for confidence level 0 were excluded from
analysis, because the frequency distribution of these
errors was almost flat and led to much lower R2 values.
To obtain reliable fits of each participant’s data, it
was necessary to sort the confidence ratings of 1–5 into
three broader cohorts of low, medium, and high
confidence (Tables S1 and S2). Frequency distributions
of orientation errors were calculated for each confi-
dence level and set size using a bin width of 108, prior to
fitting the Gaussian model. More observations were
required to obtain good R-squared measures of fit for
the low confidence data, because participants exhibited
reliable memory for the cued grating on a much smaller
percentage of these trials. Overall, the pattern of results
was robust if a sufficient number of observations were
available at each confidence level. When cohorts were
reassigned simply to ensure that a minimum number of
50 observations was available for analysis at each
confidence level, we again observed a significant
improvement in memory precision with higher ratings
of confidence, F(2, 10) ¼ 12.1, p , 0.005, and a
significant decrease in the likelihood of memory failure
with higher confidence, F(2, 10) ¼ 50.7, p , 0.0001.
The measure of memory capacity K was calculated as
follows:
KI ¼ ð1 PuniformÞ·N ð1Þ
where KI is the capacity for condition I, Puniform is the
area under the uniform distribution believed to reflect
the proportion of random guessing, and N is the set
size.
Results
We first evaluated whether subjective confidence
ratings were predictive of objective measures of the
accuracy of working memory for the cued orientation.
Plots of frequency distributions indicated that partic-
ipants’ confidence ratings varied considerably across
trials, even within each set size condition (Figure 2A).
Confidence was generally higher for set size 3 than for
set size 6, and in the latter condition there were
frequent reports of zero confidence suggestive of a
bimodal distribution. We calculated the angular
difference between the reported orientation and the
true orientation for all 1,600 trials performed by each
participant, and plotted the absolute response error for
each confidence rating level and set size (Figure 2B).
Confidence ratings were highly predictive of this
measure of working memory accuracy, F(5, 20) ¼
64.32; p , 0.0001. In addition, we found that absolute
errors were larger at set size 6 than at set size 3 for
ratings of lower confidence, as indicated by a statisti-
cally significant interaction effect between confidence
and set size, F(5, 20)¼ 4.21; p , 0.01. As can be seen in
Figure 2B, the magnitude of absolute errors steadily
increased with each decrement in confidence, and
almost reached the magnitude predicted by pure
guessing (i.e., 458) for ratings of zero confidence in
the set size 6 condition.
Next, we plotted frequency histograms to visualize
the distribution of response errors (i.e., reported
orientation minus true orientation) for each confidence
rating level and set size, with data pooled across all
participants (Figure 3A). The distribution of errors was
very different across confidence levels. When partici-
pants reported a rating of ‘0’ indicating essentially ‘no
confidence,’ the distribution of reported orientations
was almost flat, and closely resembled a uniform
distribution of random guesses. Higher ratings of
confidence were associated with more frequent reports
centered about the true orientation of the cued grating.
Ratings of highest confidence led to the most peaked
distribution with errors rarely occurring at distal
orientations.
Mixed-model analysis
We adopted a mixed-model approach, which as-
sumes that working memory performance can be
described by two key parameters: the likelihood of
successful memory maintenance and the precision of
the memory for successfully remembered items (Zhang
& Luck, 2008, 2009). This was done by fitting a circular
Gaussian-shaped model to the data for each set size
and each confidence level (see Methods). The extent to
which the entire Gaussian curve must be translated
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uniformly upwards is presumed to reflect how often the
probed item was forgotten (P-uniform), since random
guesses would be expected to lead to a uniform
distribution of responses. By contrast, the standard
deviation (SD) or ‘width’ of the Gaussian distribution
provides an estimate of the precision of memory (with
smaller SD indicating greater precision), since the
amount of internal noise with which an item is stored
should be independent of the proportion of guess
responses. (For the purposes of this study, we adopted
these measures to evaluate the data according to the
predictions of the slots-plus-averaging model, though it
should be noted other researchers have argued that
these two statistical measures may not necessarily
reflect the proportion of guessing responses or the
precision of memory (van den Berg et al., 2012).
When observers reported poor confidence in their
memory, we observed very high estimates for the
probability of memory failure for the cued item.
Ratings of zero confidence were accompanied by a
Figure 2. Confidence rating frequencies and absolute response errors. (A) Frequency distributions of confidence ratings for set sizes 3
and 6, pooled across the six participants in Experiment 1. (B) Absolute response error plotted as a function of confidence rating for set
size 3 (left) and set size 6 (right). Absolute errors for each participant were calculated based on the absolute difference between reported
orientation and true orientation for every trial of a given condition. Data for individual participants are plotted with dashed colored lines;
group-averaged data are plotted with black solid lines and error bars showing 6 1 SEM.
Figure 3. Mixed-model analysis of distribution of orientation errors for data pooled across participants. (A) Distribution of orientation
differences between reported orientation and true orientation (centered at 08), plotted by confidence rating for set size 3 (left) and set size
6 (right). Data points indicate frequency distributions using a bin width of 68; curves show the best-fitting circular Gaussian function
(centered around 08) based on the mixed model analysis. (B) Parameter estimates of the probability of memory failure (left) and precision
of memory for successfully remembered items (right) based on model fits of the data, collapsed across all participants in Experiment 1.
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failure of memory on the vast majority of trials,
whereas ratings at the highest confidence level led to
memory failure on less than 10% of trials (Figure 3B,
left panel). These results imply that observers can make
accurate metacognitive judgments regarding whether
they have successfully retained information about an
item in working memory.
Might participants also have reliable metacognitive
knowledge regarding the precision of their working
memory for a visual item? Analysis of the pooled data
across participants suggested that the visual precision
of memory tended to improve as a function of self-
reported confidence (Figure 3B, right panel). These
variations in memory precision could also be seen in the
Gaussian-shaped distribution of deviation errors for
the orientation judgments, which appeared narrower
and more precise for ratings of high confidence as
compared to low confidence (Figure 3A).
We analyzed the data of individual participants to
determine whether trial-by-trial variability in working
memory performance could be predicted by individual
confidence ratings. This analysis was needed to ensure
that the trends found in the pooled group data could
not be explained by individual differences, as could
arise if individuals with superior memory precision also
reported generally greater confidence in their memory.
Moreover, this analysis allowed us to measure the
consistency of these effects across participants, making
standard statistical testing possible. Each participant’s
confidence ratings from 1–5 were subdivided into
categories of low, medium, and high confidence, to
obtain a sufficient number of observations for reliable
estimation of the memory parameters at each set size
for that individual. (Confidence ratings of 0 were
excluded from this analysis, since they led to almost flat
distributions that could not be well-fitted by the
Gaussian-shaped model.)
We found that failure of memory for the probed item
was much more likely to occur on trials in which
observers reported low rather than high confidence in
their memory (Figure 4A). This effect was confirmed by
a within-subjects analysis of variance, F(2, 10)¼ 56.3, p
, 0.0001. These findings imply that participants had
very reliable metacognitive knowledge regarding
whether they had successfully retained information
about the probed item, though it is interesting to note
that reports of subjective confidence were graded and
probabilistic rather than all or none (Figure 2A). This
apparent lack of memory for the probed item, based on
estimates from the mixed-model analysis, could poten-
tially arise from both failures of encoding due to the
limited capacity of visual working memory (Zhang &
Luck, 2008), as well as failures of active maintenance,
especially for longer delays that considerably exceed 4 s
in duration (Zhang & Luck, 2009). We found that the
estimated probability of memory failure was far greater
for set size 6 than for set size 3 (see Figure 5A), which is
consistent with the predictions of the slot model
regarding strict item limits for encoding. On a subset
of trials, it is possible that successfully encoded items
failed to be actively maintained throughout the delay
period, though it is worth noting that our retention
interval was not unusually long (;4 s) and our
participants had an economic incentive to perform as
well as possible.
Of particular interest, it can further be seen that each
of the participants exhibited a general trend of better
memory precision on high as compared to low
confidence trials (Figure 4B). Statistical analyses
confirmed this general trend, indicating that greater
confidence was predictive of more precise reports of the
cued orientation, F(2, 10) ¼ 18.3, p , 0.0005. This
proved true even for large display sizes of six gratings,
F(2, 10) ¼ 7.224; p , 0.05, which exceed the proposed
three- to four-item limit of visual working memory
(Luck & Vogel, 1997). (Among the participants tested
here, estimates of working memory capacity (K) ranged
from 2.0 to 3.87 items.) These results indicate that
observers have reliable metacognitive knowledge of the
precision of their working memory, which can vary
across trials.
Is it possible that subjective confidence might have
varied across trials because of spurious factors, such as
momentary blinking or lapses in attention, irrespective
of the demands of the memory task itself? Given that
participants were economically rewarded for accurate
performance and could choose when to advance to the
next trial, we would expect such lapses to be very rare.
Moreover, such an account cannot explain why
confidence ratings differed greatly between set size
conditions. With a mixed-trial design, participants
could not predict the set size in advance of viewing
the briefly flashed display (200 ms duration), and yet
reports of zero confidence were rare at set size 3 while
they were the most frequent response at set size 6
(Figure 2A). Thus, confidence ratings were strongly
determined by the demands of the working memory
task. An analysis of memory performance for each set
size, pooled across all confidence ratings, further
indicated that the probability of memory failure was
far greater at the larger set size (T ¼ 9.78; p , 0.0005;
Figure 5A. In addition, working memory performance
was significantly more precise at set size 3 than at set
size 6 (T ¼ 3.98; p , 0.05; Figure 5B).
Effects of training across sessions
We also considered the possibility that working
memory performance and subjective confidence ratings
might have generally improved over the course of the
experiment, due to repeated training at the task. Such
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day-to-day improvements could potentially account for
the apparent relationship between subjective confidence
and objective performance, rather than trial-to-trial
variability. To address this issue, we calculated
estimates of the probability of memory failure and
the precision of memory for each of the 10 experimen-
tal sessions (Figure 6A, B), pooling across set sizes 3
and 6 to ensure that there was sufficient data to obtain
highly reliable fits (R2 . 0.75 in all cases). Our analyses
failed to reveal evidence of a change in the likelihood of
memory failure, F(9, 45)¼ 1.787; p¼ 0.097, or a change
in the precision of visual memory, F(9, 45) ¼ 1.61; p ¼
0.14, across sessions. Moreover, we found that
confidence ratings remained stable across sessions,
F(9, 45) ¼ 0.732; p ¼ 0.678; Figure 6C, and were
consistently higher for set size 3 than for set size 6, F(1,
45) ¼ 61.3; p , 0.0001. These findings indicate that
learning effects across sessions cannot account for the
strong relationship we observe between subjective
confidence and objective memory performance.
Analysis of nontarget responses
To what extent might spatial confusions between the
cued grating (i.e., target) and other nontarget gratings
Figure 4. Probability of memory failure and memory precision across different levels of subjective confidence. (A) Estimated probability of
memory failure (P-uniform) for trials rated with low, medium, or high subjective confidence. Data for individual participants are plotted with
dashed colored lines; group-averaged data are plotted with black solid lines and error bars showing 6 1 SEM. (B) Precision of memory
(SD) for orientations reported with low, medium or high confidence. Higher levels of confidence were predictive of smaller values of SD,
indicating superior memory precision.
Figure 5. Comparison of working memory performance for set sizes 3 and 6. (A) Estimated probability of memory failure (P-uniform) for
set sizes 3 and 6, for data pooled across all confidence levels. Individual data plotted with dashed colored lines; group average in solid
black. (B) Estimated precision of memory (SD) for set sizes 3 and 6.
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have contributed to the pattern of results found in this
study? Is it possible that on low confidence trials,
participants were more likely to exhibit such confusions
due to the misbinding of object and location informa-
tion, and might this have affected our estimates of
memory precision? According to Bays et al. (2009), a
significant proportion of apparent ‘‘guessing’’ responses
in working memory tasks can instead be attributed to
the report of a nontarget stimulus. To address this
issue, we applied their maximum likelihood fitting
procedure to our data for low, medium, and high
confidence trials, and obtained separate estimates of the
proportion of random guess responses, nontarget
responses, and the precision of memory for the
reported item.
As can be seen in Figure 7, we observed the same
overall pattern of results after incorporating nontarget
responses into our analysis. The estimated proportion
of uniform guessing responses was significantly greater
at low confidence than at high confidence, F(2, 10) ¼
17.68, p , 0.001, and also larger for set size 6 than for
set size 3, F(2, 10) ¼ 31.3, p , 0.0001. Guessing
responses occurred most frequently on low confidence
trials for set size 6, comprising about 40% of those
trials. In comparison, nontarget responses occurred
much less frequently. We did observe significantly more
nontarget responses on trials with lower confidence,
F(2, 10) ¼ 4.99, p , 0.05, suggesting that confusions
between target and nontarget items are more prevalent
when participants report low confidence. However,
even on these low confidence trials, the proportion of
nontarget responses did not exceed 3.4% and 11.9%
for set sizes 3 and 6, respectively.
To what extent did these nontarget responses impact
our estimates of memory precision?
With nontargets incorporated into our analysis, we
again found that higher ratings of subjective confidence
were predictive of more precise memory for orienta-
tion, F(2, 10) ¼ 21.6, p , 0.0005. Thus, greater
confidence is associated with decreased likelihood of
guessing, decreased confusions between target and
Figure 6. Effects of training on working memory performance and confidence ratings. (A) Probability of memory failure for each of the 10
test sessions in Experiment 1. Data were pooled across set sizes 3 and 6 to obtain reliable parameter estimates for all individual
participants (R2 . 0.75 in all cases). (B) Estimates of memory precision plotted by session. (C) Confidence ratings plotted by experimental
session for set sizes 3 and 6. Statistical analyses indicated that there were no reliable changes in memory performance or confidence
ratings across sessions.
Figure 7. Parameter estimates with nontarget responses included in mixed model analysis. (A) Estimated probability of random guessing
(P-uniform) for different confidence levels, using a mixed model analysis that includes possible nontarget responses. (B) Estimated
probability of nontarget responses. Such responses were quite rare overall, but did occur more frequently on trials involving lower self-
reported confidence and larger set size. Note that target responses (not shown) included all remaining trials that were not classified as
nontarget responses or random guessing. (C) Estimated precision of memory (SD) for this analysis. Individual data shown with dotted
lines, group data shown with solid lines and error bars indicating 6 1 SEM. Dark blue, set size 3; light blue, set size 6.
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nontargets, and superior memory precision for success-
fully maintained targets.
Additional control experiment
We conducted a separate control experiment to
ensure that our main results did not depend on the fact
that subjective confidence ratings were made prior to
reporting the orientation of the cued grating. In
Experiment 2, participants first reported the orientation
of the cued grating, and then reported their confidence
in their memory (Figure 8A). Observers were first asked
if they had any memory at all for the cued grating, and
if they responded yes, were then asked to rate how well
they remembered the cued grating on a scale of 1 (not
well) to 5 (very well). The stimuli and experimental
conditions were otherwise the same as those of the
main experiment, with participants performing a total
of 1,600 trials over a series of 10 testing sessions.
Participants did not receive additional pay for accurate
performance in this experiment; nevertheless, the same
pattern of results was found in the pooled data across
participants (Figure 8B, C). We analyzed the data of
individual participants, after binning trials according to
low, medium and high confidence ratings (Table S2).
Our analyses indicated that both the likelihood of
successful memory maintenance, F(2, 10) ¼ 28.2, p ,
0.0001, and the precision of visual memory, F(2, 10) ¼
6.1; p , 0.05, were better at high than low confidence
(Figure 9).
We directly compared the results of this second
experiment with data from the first experiment, by
performing a combined ANOVA with experiment type
as a between-groups factor. We found no evidence of a
difference in overall probability of memory failure or
memory precision across experiments (F , 1 in both
cases). More important, we found that the combined
data across the two experiments led to highly significant
effects of confidence for probability of memory failure,
F(2, 20)¼ 76.7; p , 0.0001, and memory precision, F(2,
20)¼18.1; p , 0.0001, with no evidence of an interaction
between these effects of confidence and experiment type
(F , 1 in both cases). From these results, we can
conclude that the relationship between subjective
confidence and working memory performance is highly
reliable, and unaffected by whether the confidence rating
or the memory report is performed first.
Figure 8. Experimental design and pooled group results for Experiment 2. (A) Design for Experiment 2. After presentation of the sample
display, participants first reported the orientation of the cued grating and then rated the accuracy of their memory. They were cued
(‘‘Remember?’’) to make a binary decision indicating whether they had any memory of the cued grating. For ‘yes’ responses, they were
then asked to rate how well they remembered the grating’s orientation, from 1 (not well at all) to 5 (very well). (B) Pooled group data
showing the distribution of orientation errors, plotted by confidence rating separately for set sizes 3 and 6. Data points indicate frequency
distributions using a bin width of 68; curves show the best-fitting Gaussian function (centered around 08) based on the mixed model
analysis. (C) Parameter estimates of the probability of memory failure (left) and the precision of memory for successfully remembered
items (right) based on model fits of the pooled group data.
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Discussion
Our study provides novel evidence that people have
accurate metacognitive knowledge regarding the reli-
ability and precision of their working memory for
specific items. Through the use of subjective confidence
ratings, we found that the visual precision of working
memory can indeed fluctuate from trial to trial. These
findings demonstrate the variable nature of the visual
working memory system, and may help inform current
theories and models.
According to the slots-plus-averaging model, work-
ing memory consists of three to four discrete slots, each
of which can store a single object with a fixed degree of
visual resolution (Zhang & Luck, 2008). If the number
of display items exceeds the capacity of working
memory, then each available slot will be used to retain
a unique item with fixed precision, and any residual
items must necessarily be discarded. Current versions
of this model do not address or account for the
possibility of variability in memory precision, for
conditions in which the number of items exceed
working memory capacity. Indeed, several studies by
Zhang and Luck have emphasized the fact that memory
precision appears fixed across a variety of experimental
manipulations. For example, changes in display dura-
tion (110 ms vs. 340 ms) were found to affect the
probability of successful memory maintenance but did
not affect memory precision for successfully main-
tained items (Zhang & Luck, 2008). Similarly, exper-
imental manipulations of retention duration, spatial
attentional cuing (comparing neutral and invalid
conditions), and strategic instructions to emphasize
memory capacity or precision, were found to have no
effect on memory precision (Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2009,
2011). Some researchers have reported modest decre-
ments in memory precision for increases in set size
beyond three to four items or for backward masked
stimuli that are displayed for less than 100 ms (Bays et
al., 2009; Bays, Gorgoraptis, Wee, Marshall, & Husain,
2011), but these effects required direct manipulations of
the visual display. By contrast, here we find that the
resolution of visual working memory can indeed
fluctuate from trial to trial due to strictly endogenous
factors, in the absence of experimental manipulations
of the stimuli or task.
However, our results also run contrary to the
predictions of standard resource models (Bays &Husain,
2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). These models assume that it
should be possible to retain more than three to four items
by trading off visual resolution for increased capacity,
but do not address the possibility that memory precision
might vary across items or trials when set size is held
constant. Another problem arises from the fact that most
resource models rely on a signal detection framework to
account for changes in performance across set size, which
does not allow for item limits or uniform guessing
responses. Such a framework would have difficulty
accounting for the heavy tails that were observed in the
Figure 9. Memory performance across different confidence levels for Experiment 2. (A) Estimated probability of memory failure (P-
uniform) for trials rated with low, medium, or high subjective confidence in Experiment 2. (B) Estimates of memory precision (SD). Working
memory performance was significantly more precise on trials with higher confidence ratings, F(2, 10) ¼ 6.1; p , 0.05. Dashed colored
lines show individual data; solid black lines show group-averaged data.
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distribution of errors on low confidence trials (e.g.,
Figure 3A). Based on our mixed-model analysis, we
found that estimates of memory precision for set size 6
were only fractionally worse on low as compared to high
confidence trials (SD of 20.28 vs. 15.78, respectively), and
yet the likelihood of memory failure was almost six times
greater on low than high confidence trials (53% vs. 9%,
respectively) due to the heavy tails in the error
distribution. Signal detection-based models would re-
quire a much greater loss of memory precision (i.e., much
larger SD) to account for the heavy tails on low
confidence trials.
How then might our findings be reconciled with
current models of working memory? One possibility is
that the visual working memory system can maintain a
limited number of individual objects (Zhang & Luck,
2008) or features (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Fougnie,
Asplund, & Marois, 2010), as predicted by slots-plus-
averaging, but that the precision of each stored visual
representation can vary to some extent. Based on our
estimates from the mixed-model analysis, average
working memory precision (SD) varied over a modest
range of about 158–208 between conditions of low and
high confidence. Modest variations in memory preci-
sion could partly arise from limitations of perceptual
encoding, perhaps due to variations in visual sensitivity
across the visual field (Westheimer, 2003) or other such
factors. Fluctuations in memory precision might also
reflect the degree of internal noise present in the
nervous system (Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005; Wilken &
Ma, 2004), as greater noise during the encoding or
maintenance period would lead to less precise memory
performance. Finally, memory precision might depend
on the amount of attention directed to each item in the
visual display during the encoding phase, as focal
attention has been shown to improve the spatial
resolution of visual processing in both perceptual and
short-term memory tasks (Bays et al., 2011; Yeshurun
& Carrasco, 1998; Zhang & Luck, 2008). However,
caution is required here if one assumes that attentional
resources can be distributed in a continuous manner
across items in the visual field, as the slots-plus-
averaging model is distinguished by its core assumption
that central resources are allocated in discretized units.
An alternative account of our findings would be a
continuous resource model that allows for variability in
memory precision as part of its core framework.
Recently, van den Berg et al. (2012) proposed a
variable-precision model of working memory, in which
the amount of encoding resources assigned to each item
in a display can randomly vary across items and trials.
Variable precision in this model is based on the
assumption that the distribution of errors at a given
set size should reflect the sum of a continuous set of
circular Gaussian (or von Mises) distributions of
varying precision, ranging from extremely coarse to
very fine. This model assumes that the working memory
system has no discrete limits; instead, what appears to
be a uniform random-guessing component in the
distribution of errors is attributed to extremely coarse
memory representations on a subset of trials. It would
be interesting for future studies to evaluate whether the
variable-precision resource model might provide a good
fit to our data across variations in self-reported
confidence, and to compare this with a modified slots-
plus averaging model with discrete item limits that
allows for modest variations in memory precision.
Our study further demonstrates that people can make
remarkably accurate metacognitive judgments regarding
the accuracy of their own memories. Confidence ratings
were highly predictive of whether or not an item was
successfully retained, with failures of memory rarely
occurring during reports of high confidence. These
findings are consistent with the proposal that the
contents of working memory appear to be immediately
accessible to consciousness (Baars & Franklin, 2003;
Baddeley, 2000). Our results suggest that this is likely to
be true, as participants were able to introspect whether
they had a memory representation for what was
previously presented at the cued location. However,
current theories of working memory would not neces-
sarily anticipate that confidence ratings should be
predictive of the precision of visual working memory.
Such metacognitive judgments of memory precision are
much less straightforward to implement. Participants did
not have the opportunity to directly compare their
memories to the previously seen items, nor did they
receive feedback regarding how accurately they had
performed on the task for any specific trial. This implies
that observers can assess the quality or clarity of their
internal visual representations to some degree, and
evaluate the degree of internal noise with which an item
is stored. This ability to evaluate the quality of one’s
internal visual representations may be related to recent
neuroimaging studies that have revealed the presence of
item-specific activity in early visual areas during working
memory maintenance (Harrison & Tong, 2009; Serences,
Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 2009). Our findings add to a
growing literature on the cognitive and neural bases of
metacognitive judgments (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan,
& Rees, 2010; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Song et al., 2011),
as well as recent work on the reliability of metacognitive
judgments pertaining to mental imagery (Pearson et al.,
2011).
The present study illustrates how research on human
metacognition can provide insights into the nature of
cognitive systems. An interesting question for future
research would be to explore whether reliable metacog-
nitive performance might be integral to the effective
functioning of the working memory system. If a system’s
contents must be continually updated while operating
near its capacity limits, then such a system might greatly
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benefit from having a mechanism to evaluate the
accuracy of its own contents. More generally, the ability
to evaluate whether or not a perception or memory is
accurate could prove helpful for making informed
decisions in a variety of settings, especially those in
which one must act or bet on the reliability of one’s own
judgments (Hampton, 2001; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009;
Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007).
Conclusions
The visual precision of working memory for individual
items can fluctuate from one trial to the next. Observers
were able to make accurate metacognitive judgments
about the content and also the precision of their working
memory for a specific item. This latter type of judgment is
considerably more subtle and complex, as participants
did not have the opportunity to directly compare their
memory to the item itself, which was previously seen
several seconds ago; nor did they receive immediate
feedback regarding their performance. We found that
visual working memory is fundamentally variable in
nature. Such variability has not been considered in most
previous models of working memory, although variable
precision could be incorporated into models that assume
limited discrete slots or continuous resources. The
present findings inform an ongoing debate regarding
the defining functional properties of the visual working
memory system.
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